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1. Introduction 
Pharmaceuticals play an important role in keeping people fit, but they can also put live at 
risk if they don’t have the required quality. Contamination and mix-up may have a great 
impact on them because of their tiny active doses and because of the often precarious state 
of health of the patients, not to mention the existence of routes of administration, which skip 
certain defense barriers of the body. 
To cope with this problem “Good Manufacturing Practice” (GMP) was introduced in the 
1960s with the intention of providing a kind of common quality baseline for all laboratories. 
GMP, however, consists of general rules, and as such, it can neither give an answer to every 
practical situation, nor replace the need to study and understand processes in depth, as 
some people wanted to believe. 
This is why the American FDA initiative on GMP, launched in 2002, underlined the need of 
taking decisions based on knowledge and science “in [1]”. 
The ICH (International conference on harmonization of technical requirements for the 
registration of pharmaceuticals for human use) has given world-wide diffusion to this 
initiative and put it into practice by publishing several closely related Q (quality) guidelines 
“in [2-5]”. 
These guidelines have to be applied conjointly in order to ensure that the quality of a 
product is, first of all, developed and, then, monitored within a quality management system. 
This pharmaceutical quality system, as defined by ICH guideline Q10, has two “enablers”: 
knowledge management and quality risk management. 
Knowledge management is defined as a systematic approach to acquiring, analyzing, storing, 
and disseminating information related to products, manufacturing processes and components. 
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Whereas, quality risk management is described as a systematic process for the assessment, control, 
communication and review of risks to the quality of the medicinal product across the product lifecycle. 
They are called enablers because they constitute a tool or process which provides the means to 
achieve an objective. 
The importance of quality risk management (QRM) is such that a whole ICH guideline, Q9, 
has been devoted to it. 
Thus, QRM combined with GMP and science is a kind of “magical potion”, which we can 
use to become “wizards” ensuring quality. However, this is only true if we understand what 
QRM is and use it in the right way. 
Unfortunately practice shows that the real role of QRM is not always understood and as it 
has already happened in the recent past (e.g., with validation) it can become something that 
is only done, because it is required by the Authorities, but that it does not yield what it 
might and is just written for the occasion, shown and filed. And this is not something 
unimportant because resources which are misused here become resources that lack there… 
Let us then review some key points for making the most of quality risk management (QRM). 
2. Knowledge is the base of everything 
QRM is a powerful machine but to move has to be filled with a kind of fuel called “knowledge”. 
If we don’t know anything about our product or process, we cannot manage risk. Risk, by 
definition, is the combination of the probability and severity of a hazard. And if we don’t 
know the hazards, not to say their likelihood and importance, there is no way for QRM. 
 
Figure 1. Hazard – Risk - Harm 
This explains why knowledge management is put beside QRM as an enabler. Experience 
shows that more often than not information on the products and on the processes is “lost”, 
either because it is not duly registered and disappears or because it is just kept away by a 
given person and never diffused within the company. The result is that in many cases there 
is or there was information but it is not available when needed by the persons of the 
company who have to take a decision. 
And the fact is that if we cannot gather information on the product or process, either in 
house or outside it (other sites, publications, courses, etc.) it is very unlikely that we might 
follow a QRM approach. In other words, both enablers are linked and thus, the amount and 
Hazard Risk Harm 
The potential 
source of harm 
Damage to health, including the 
damage that can occur from loss 
of product quality or availability. 
The combination of the probability 
of occurrence of harm and the 
severity of that harm. 
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characteristics of the knowledge at our disposal will be one of the main factors which will 
dictate how to perform our QRM. 
 
Figure 2. Quality risk management steps 
QRM is the result of a certain number of operations or steps, which can be summarized in 
different ways differing only slightly one from the other. The first part of QRM is evidently 
devoted to the quality risk analysis (QRA), that is, to the estimation of the risk associated with 
the identified hazards, whereas the second one concerns, properly speaking, the 
administration of this risk. Any QRM process has to start by defining its goal (what is 
intended) and by gathering information. All other steps are shaped by this first one. 
But, speaking in practical terms, what kind of knowledge we need? Let us try to respond to 
this question by considering three different cases. 
2.1. Product 
If we are dealing with a product, we might need to be familiar with: 
 Its characteristics and specifications 
 Its CQAs (critical quality attributes), that is physical, chemical, biological or microbiological 
properties or characteristics that should be within an appropriate limit, range, or distribution to 
ensure the desired product quality “in [4]”. 
Define objectives and 
gather information 
Quality risk 
analysis 
(QRA) 
Quality risk 
management 
(QRM) 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Define the procedure 
Perform the analysis 
Modify as necessary 
Revise the analysis 
Draw consequences 
Write a report 
Follow-up 
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 The factors that might affect its quality 
 The likelihood of these factors and the effects of the loss of quality 
And this can only be achieved by people possessing or gathering this knowledge and 
analyzing it subsequently by means of brainstorming. A table like the following one can be 
helpful in performing this. 
 
Problems (what can 
affect its quality?) 
Causes (what might 
provoke this 
problem?) 
Likeness (is 
that likely to 
happen?) 
Preventive measures (what could 
we do to control or mitigate this 
problem?) 
Particle size Inadequate particle 
size 
Yes Provide the supplier with detailed 
specifications 
Contamination 
(bioburden / 
pesticides) 
Product of natural 
origin 
Maybe Tight control of the sources of 
product 
Degradation Too high temperature Probable Determine acceptable temperature 
range 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 1. Table for product brainstorming 
Several approaches have been proposed to facilitate this brainstorming, such as, 
 Imagine different situations (e.g. change of supplier, lack of electricity, flood, error, mix-
up, etc.) and then answering to “what would happen”? 
 Ask people working or having worked in this situation. 
 Inquire regulatory authorities. 
 Review technical literature and attend congresses. 
2.2. Process 
If we are dealing with a process we might need to be aware of: 
 Its flow-chart; 
 Its equipment; 
 Its CPPs (critical process parameters), that is process parameters whose variability has an 
impact on a critical quality attribute and therefore should be monitored or controlled to ensure 
the process produces the desired quality “in [4]”. 
 The factors which can affect them and the ways for doing this; 
 The likeness and the consequences of these deviations. 
Exactly as said above, this has to be done by people possessing or gathering this knowledge. 
In this case, the table might appear like this one. 
The approach to be followed is the same that was mentioned before. 
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Process 
stage 
Problems (Deviations 
from the normal 
situation?) 
Causes (what 
might provoke 
this problem?) 
Likeness (is that 
likely to 
happen?) 
Preventive measures (what 
could we do to control or 
mitigate this problem?) 
#1 Wrong weight of 
starting material 
Error Maybe Scales will be provided with 
a printer 
#3 Irregular dosage of vials 
because dose is very low
Filler has not 
enough capacity 
Yes Qualify filler and organize a 
monitoring system for filled 
vials 
#8 Lack of leaflet Leaflet fell outside 
the box 
No A weighing machine 
controls each box 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 2. Table for process brainstorming 
2.3. Comparison 
And finally, if we are comparing two different situations, then we should identify: 
 Their characteristics (their main attributes and sub-attributes); 
 The elements likely to influence them; 
 Our needs / requirements. 
 
Attributes Sub-attributes Influence (which role 
they may play?) 
Preventive measures (what could we do to 
control or mitigate this problem?) 
Premises HVAC 
configuration 
Risk of cross-
contamination 
Dedicated HVAC system without recycling 
Pressure 
differentials 
Protection of the 
environment 
Containment of the product by negative 
differential pressure surrounded by positive 
differential pressure 
Personnel Training High risk of error / 
confusion 
Ensure adequate training 
Protection Manipulation of active 
products 
Introduce isolators where product is exposed 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 3. Table for comparing two different situations / elements 
In this case brainstorming can be facilitated by: 
 Carefully analyzing the attributes and sub-attributes (e.g., the factors which intervene in 
the constitution of this situation / element). 
 Ask people about their experience on this. 
 Inquiring regulatory authorities. 
 Reviewing technical literature and attending congresses. 
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3. GMP and QRM 
An interesting question that might arise as a consequence of the application of QRM is about 
precedence. What is more important a GMP statement or the result of a QRA? This is 
however a completely false question because if GMP can be considered the logic baseline in 
pharmaceutical production, then how can QRA be anything different? 
 
Figure 3. Problem management 
In fact QRM is complementary to GMP because it provides the frame for taking a decision, 
whereas GMP proposes us some practical and well known solutions. It is important to 
understand that “good manufacturing practice” has been, and still is, accompanied by some 
amount of “bad practice”. And this is the result of seeing in GMP as a kind of oracle which 
will provide us with magical solutions. 
No solution for a problem should be looked for, before having defined it perfectly. This 
assertion might seem surprising but experience shows that analysis is often left aside 
because all attention is eagerly focused on the quick search of a solution. 
Once the problem is well understood and its causes and likely effects have been determined 
is when the search for a solution can be started. In any case this requires, as said before, 
possessing knowledge. It is evident that GMP has to be taken into account, but only when 
the problem has been analyzed and understood in depth. Then, an answer to the problem 
can be found and it is evident that it will be science and knowledge-based and GMP 
compliant. 
4. Selection of tools 
There are different tools which can be used in QRM, both unspecific and specific for this 
task “in [2, 6]”. In reality, and very unpleasantly for some people, tools just organize in a 
more or less sophisticated way the information that we have. They will neither provide us 
with the knowledge that we don’t have nor liberate us from the task of thinking about the 
question. Brainstorming will always be inevitable. 
Problem / question / doubt 
1st Define it 
2nd Look for its cause/s 
5th Look for possible solutions 
3rd Establish its effect/s 
Adopted solution / approach 
4th Gather information on it 
6th What about GMP? 
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According to their function QRM tools can be classified in three main groups: risk analysis, 
risk comparison and statistical support. 
Risk analysis tools are either inductive or deductive. The first, starting with the normal 
operation, try to detect possible problems. The second, starting with the problem, try to find 
the chain of events that led to it. It is also very common to talk about formal and informal 
tools. In fact the former have really been devised for this purpose, whereas the latter are just 
data given in a certain way and they can be only considered “tools” in a loose sense. 
It might seem surprising to explain that there are QRM tools that do not consider risk, but 
hazard. Although this is discussed in more detail below, here we need only point out that 
“risk analysis or management” is a general concept which can consider just hazards or their 
associated risk too. 
 
Characteristics Tools
Tools for 
risk 
analysis 
Inductive 
/ single 
factors 
Basic / Informal 
Simple 
organization 
of data
Flowchart / Process map / 
Checklist/ Ishikawa diagram 
(fishbone), etc. 
Formal 
Identification of 
hazards and 
their potential 
effects 
Risk is not 
estimated 
PHA (Preliminary Hazard Analysis) 
Risk is 
estimated 
PRA (Preliminary Risk Analysis) 
Evaluation of 
failure modes 
and of their 
potential effects
Risk is not 
estimated 
FMEA (Failure Mode Effects 
Analysis)
Risk is 
estimated 
FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis) 
Evaluation and monitoring of 
hazard
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points) 
Analysis of deviations by means 
of “key words”
HAZOP (Hazard Operability 
Analysis) 
Deductiv
e / 
multiple 
factors
Identification of real or potential 
problems 
FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) 
Tools for risk comparison Risk Ranking and Filtering 
Supporting statistical tools 
Control charts / Design of 
experiments / Histograms / Pareto 
charts / Process capability analysis 
Table 4. Basic classification of tools used in QRM 
Even if it is true that specific tools have been developed with an intended objective, and this 
somewhat restricts their scope of use, there is often overseen that they can have a wider 
utility. In fact tools are at our service and we should use them to organize information in 
order to get the most of it. Except in those cases when there is a need for coordination, e. g., 
different sites of the same group, or a requirement by the Authorities we should feel free in 
the way we use QRM tools. 
In practice, it is possible to distinguish six basic cases in QRM: 
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1. As it has been indicated before the presentation of data is a basic need in QRM, hence 
informal tools, such as flow charts are necessary. 
2. A first task in any QRM is hazard assessment and for doing this PHA is the right tool. 
3. If risk assessment is desired, then FMECA is what we need. 
4. HACCP is an appropriate tool for the monitoring of processes by means of their 
parameters. 
5. When the search for the root cause of an event is required then FTA will do. 
6. RRF allows for comparisons. 
These six cases will cover practically all the needs regarding QRM. Understanding and 
using them can thus be considered a must. 
 
QRM tool Practical utilization 
 Check lists, reports, graphs, etc. 
 Diagrams (flow, Pareto, Ishikawa), histograms, etc.
Basic data presentation 
PHA (Primary hazard analysis) Basic hazard assessment 
FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects & Criticality Analysis) Risk assessment 
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points) Process monitoring 
FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) Root cause identification 
RRF (Risk ranking and filtering) Comparison 
Table 5. QRM most common tools and their practical utilization 
4.1. Basic data presentation 
Any system may be used to gather and present data and further on we provide some 
examples. Ishikawa and Pareto diagrams not only show data but the first organizes them at 
a certain level and the second treats them statistically. This is why they are also mentioned 
for the root cause identification. 
4.2. Basic hazard assessment 
In every situation (product, process, etc.) there is a period of time, in the beginning, when 
knowledge is very limited and unsure. Suppositions count more than facts. Then, there is a 
very simple tool, perfectly adapted to this situation: PHA (Primary hazard analysis) “in [2, 6]”. 
It is developed by using a table, which might vary slightly according to specific needs or 
requirements, but which considers basically these items: hazards, causes, effects and 
preventive measures. Note that often it is not necessary to consider the “effects”, as they are 
either evident or are already somewhat included in the “hazard”. 
The hazards which put the quality of the products at risk during their manufacturing may 
belong to five categories: 
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 Contamination (external): Any contamination of a material or of a product not related 
to other materials or products manufactured in the factory (e. g., pollen, sand, hair, 
scales, dandruff, fibers, microorganisms, etc.) 
 Cross-contamination: Contamination of a material or of a product with another material 
or product. 
 Environmental contamination: Contamination of the production rooms, the operators 
or the surroundings of the pharmaceutical unit because of the voluntary or accidental 
liberation of materials or products 
 Mix up / error: Operation inadequately performed (error) or where one thing is taken 
by another one (mix up) 
 Degradation: Loss of quality of the product because of inadequate conditions 
The following table uses this approach: 
 
Hazard Cause Preventive measures Comments 
Contamination 
(outer) 
Inflow of dirty air 
Separation of production 
areas and air control 
Airlock doors are interlocked. 
Air is filtered. 
Cross-
contamination 
Inadequate CIP 
cleaning 
Vessel is dirty Cleaning is validated. 
Dust liberation Dust extraction system 
Effectiveness of extraction is 
verified 
Mix up / Error 
Transfer of wrong 
material 
Inadequate product 
Double verification. 
Materials are controlled and 
registered while entering and 
while being used. 
Environmental 
contamination 
Isolator is not kept 
at depression 
Room and people 
contaminated 
Isolator is provided with a 
pressure gauge. 
Isolator has an alarm system for 
pressure. 
Degradation 
Inadequate 
temperature 
Air conditioning Temperature is controlled 
Inadequate 
humidity 
Air conditioning with 
control of humidity 
Relative humidity is kept ≤ 30% 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 6. PHA table 
4.3. Risk assessment 
In order to analyze quality risks in the operations, when there is a significant amount of 
operator participation, the choice tool is FMECA (failure mode, effects and criticality 
analysis) “in [2, 6, 7]”. It is performed by using a table possessing these main headings: 
 Failure mode: the way an element can have a potential failure (in relation to 
specifications) or do not develop its functions. They are detected as an answer to the 
question “what might go wrong? It has to be pointed out that a simple function may 
have several failure modes. 
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 Cause: the grounds which provoke a failure. 
 Effect: the results which appear when the failure mode comes out. 
 
# 
Operation / 
Process 
stage 
Failure mode 
S 
(Severity)
Cause 
P 
(Probability)
Existing 
controls 
D 
(Difficulty 
of detection)
Risk 
priorisation 
(PR = S x P x 
D) 
Risk accepted? 
(comments) 
3 Agitation 
Speed < 1.400 
rpm 
2 Failure 1 
Monitoring 
by 
computer 
1 2 
Yes (a tachymeter is 
in place; speed can 
vary without 
sensible effect) 
5 Dissolution Degradation 3 
Temperature > 
80ºC 
1 
Monitoring 
by 
computer 
1 3 
Yes (T is controlled 
and materials are 
not affected) 
9 Filling 
Inadequate 
dosage 
3 
Failure / 
wrong 
adjustment 
1 
Every tube 
is weighed 
after filling
1 3 
Yes (equipment is 
qualified and scales 
are calibrated) 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 7. FMECA table 
This table may include risk reduction and be used as an instrument of risk management. 
 
 
# 
Operation / 
Process 
stage 
Failure 
mode 
S Cause P 
Control 
in place 
D RP 
Risk 
accepted? 
Actions 
Reevaluation 
Risk 
accepted? S P D PR 
                
Table 8. FMECA table for risk reduction 
4.4. Process monitoring 
It is evident that if a process is well understood it is possible to identify its CPPs and if we 
can keep them under control by a process monitoring system then the quality of the 
products will be ensured. 
 
Figure 4. HACCP rationale 
Definition of the product / process / system
Hazard identification
Risk analysis 
and evaluation
Acceptable? 
CCP management 
and periodical review
Implement measures for a 
better process control and 
for reducing risk 
Application of control measures
Define CCPs and 
establish control 
limits for them
CCP monitoring
Establish corrective measures to be implemented 
when a CCP is out of range
Inacceptable? 
Risk reduction Risk evaluation 
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HACCP (hazard analysis and critical control points) is a method that detects the hazards for 
the quality of the products (or for the safety) and then their “critical control points” (CCP) 
“in [2, 6, 8]”. The rational of HACCP is exposed in the annexed figure. 
The flow chart is studied to identify potential hazards, which might affect the quality of the 
product. Then these hazards have to be assessed. Do they have to be controlled? 
 
 
Seriousness of harm
Insignificant Minor Severe Critical Catastrophic 
Probability 
of harm 
Always     High risk 
Frequently 
(probable) 
   
  
Sometimes   Medium risk   
Rare (improbable)      
Non observable Low risk     
Table 9. Example of risk evaluation 
This leads to the determination of the CCPs. 
 
Operation / 
Process stage 
Potential hazard 
Is risk 
significant? 
Why? 
Preventive 
measures 
Is it a 
CCP? 
Test for endotoxin 
in water 
Presence of endotoxin 
in water 
Yes 
Endotoxin is not 
allowed 
Monitoring Yes 
Measure of pH pH outside range Yes Precipitation Verify pH Yes 
Filter sterilization 
Viable microbes in the 
filter 
Yes Product not sterile 
Process validation 
and monitoring 
Yes 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 10. HACCP – I: CCP establishment 
The rationale for the establishment of CCP can be summarized as follows. 
 
Figure 5. Rationale for the establishment of a CCP 
Is there in this stage a hazard with enough probability and seriousness to make it necessary its control? 
It is not a CCP 
Modify as necessary 
Is there a control measure for this hazard?
Yes No 
Is it necessary to control this stage in order 
to reduce / eliminate the hazard? 
Is it necessary to control this stage in order to 
ensure the quality of the product 
It is a CCP It is not a CCP
Yes No 
Yes No Yes No 
It is not a CCP 
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Then, for each CCP are defined alert and acceptance limits. As a consequence, monitoring 
procedures are established and they are accompanied by the set up of corrective actions in 
case of deviation. Finally as in any monitoring system it is necessary to define how it will be 
managed and periodically reviewed to verify that it performs as expected. 
 
CCP 
Acceptable 
range 
Monitoring
Corrective actions 
Who? How? When 
Test for endotoxin in 
water 
< 0,25 U. QC technician LAL test 
Before 
starting the 
production 
Stop production and call 
the supervisor 
Measure of pH pH = 6-7 
Production 
supervisor 
pH-meter In process 
Call the supervisor. Add 
more sodium hydroxide 
Filter sterilization Sterile 
Production 
technician 
Control process 
parameters (P, T and t) 
After 
sterilization 
Stop production and call 
the supervisor 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation 
Table 11. HACCP – II: CCP monitoring 
4.5. Root cause identification 
When a deviation is detected it is necessary to implement corrective and preventive actions 
(CAPA system), But this is only possible if the root cause has been identified. To do this we 
can use several tools, both unspecific (such as Ishikawa or Pareto diagrams) and specific 
(FTA). 
 
Figure 6. Diagrams of Ishikawa and Pareto 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
100% 
50% 
0% 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Most important causes
Causes of deviation
 
Factor 1 Factors which contribute to the effect 
Causes (primary and secondary)/ 
EFFECT 
Factor 2 
Factor 4 Factor 3 
Primary cause 
Secondary cause
Causes (primary and secondary)/ 
Factors which contribute to the effect 
Ishikawa 
Pareto 
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Two simple tools can be used for a primary analysis of causes. 
The first one is the diagram of Ishikawa, also known as cause-effect or fishbone diagram, 
which shows in a graphical way cause relations and their interaction to provoke an 
effect.  
The second one is the diagram of Pareto, which orders the data in relation to their 
importance and this allows for the distinction among frequent and infrequent causes of 
failures. It is prepared by listing all the elements and determining their frequencies. Then, 
the elements are classified in relation to their cumulative frequency. 
FTA (fault tree analysis) is a deductive tool which uses a pictogram to represent in an organized 
way the factors (causes) which produce or contribute to the production of an undesirable event 
“in [2, 6, 9]”. 
The tree is started by placing the top event. Then the events which contributed to it are 
analyzed. Events are united by gates, which show the relation amongst them. 
Gates can be very varied, but the most common ones are the “and” and “or” gates. 
Although there are specific gate symbols defined by an international standard, in practice 
for most cases it would suffice to represent them by a circle and write inside to which type 
they belong. 
 
 
Figure 7. FTA diagram 
 
 
Figure 8. FTA: Examples of “and” and “or” gates 
Contaminated object
Dirty gloves Glove contact
and 
Faulty sterilization Inadequate manipulation
or 
Contaminated environment 
Contaminated vial 
Basic event: It initiates a 
failure and does not need 
further development. 
Intermediate event: 
It connects the top 
event to the basic 
events. 
Event
Gate: It connects the events 
defining their causality reports
Top event: The failure or 
deviation, which starts the AAP 
 Risk Management – Current Issues and Challenges 400 
 
 
Figure 9. RRF: Example of hazard or problem decomposition (factors intervening in cleaning) 
4.6. Comparison 
RRF (Risk ranking and filtering) is a tool specifically devised for the comparison of different 
sets (units, processes, companies, etc.) possessing varied levels of risks “in [2, 6, 10]”. Once 
they are reduced to a common denominator they can be compared and this allows for the 
establishment of priorities. 
As in any method, it is necessary to individualize first the hazards or problems and then the 
different attributes, components or elements, which contribute to them. 
Then each attribute, component or element is evaluated in terms of risk. 
 
Figure 10. RRF: Risk estimation 
It is possible to get a comprehensive evaluation taking into account all the intervening 
elements. This allows for the ranking of the problems or hazards, which can be filtered. 
Problem / Hazard 
Classification 
Evaluation 
Low Middle High 
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
Supplier compliance (example) 
Element 
Classification 
Evaluation 
Low (1) Middle (2) High (3) 
GMP Deficient Acceptable Certified 2 
Q system Deficient Acceptable Certified 1 
Audits None By other By us 3 
Documents Deficient Good Excellent 2 
History >5 problems <5 problems No problems 2 
    10 
 
CLEANING 
… 
Product 
manufactured 
previously 
Solubility in water 
Therapeutic single dose 
Adsorption to surfaces 
Particle size 
Moisture 
Stability 
Batch size 
Product 
manufactured 
afterwards 
Maximum daily dose 
Batch size 
Characteristics of 
the manufacturing 
process 
Moisture 
Dispersion 
Time befor cleaning 
Surface extension 
Type of surface 
Material of construction
Design 
Mode of use 
Type of automatisation 
Characteristics of the 
equipment used 
Type of automatisation 
Temperature 
Time 
Products used 
Characteristics of the 
cleaning process 
Time remaining dirty 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
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Figure 11. Hazard – Risk - Harm 
It is also possible to rank and filter risks by using tables combining the three well-known 
factors (probability, severity and difficulty of detection). 
 
Figure 12. RRF: Combination of the risk factors 
5. Is it really necessary to determine risk in QRM? 
This is not the kind of stupid question that, at first sight, might seem. And in fact this is not 
a question, but two. The first one might be related to the fact that in everyday’s life we 
somehow tend to mix-up hazard and risk. As the latter is the consequence of the former, we 
tend to consider both practically as synonymous. The second one comes out because of the 
fact that identification of hazards is a prerequisite for the determination of their risk, and 
risk allows for an assessment of hazard. Thus, why to limit ourselves to something of “low 
level” like hazard when we can get something “better” like risk? Unfortunately this is not 
correct. By definition, to determine risk we have to start by knowing the probability of 
occurrence of the hazard. And this is often very difficult and in the end it turns to be just an 
inference. Then, we should know the seriousness of the harm and, although this is usually 
clearer, it is neither an easy task and often requires some degree of imagination. 
Consequently, in many cases, risk is not more than an estimation, that has to be improved 
along the time as more experience is collected. The case might be that hazard, usually a 
concrete thing, is substituted by risk, an estimated value and this can hardly be something 
better. 
In practice, our first aim should be to determine hazard and then, only if there is an objective 
possibility of estimating risk, do it. Speaking in general terms the evolution should be 
hazard detection > qualitative risk estimation > quantitative risk estimation. In projects or 
new processes we would move towards the left (hazard), whereas as we gain process 
knowledge we might move towards the right (risk). 
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Summarizing, although we talk about QRM it is perfectly acceptable just to determine 
hazard and manage it in terms of making the appearance of harm an unluckily event by 
applying corrective measures. It is better to limit a QRA to the hazards that trying to 
estimate risk without having enough information for doing it. 
6. How to determine risk? 
Risk is determined by the combination of the two already mentioned factors, probability 
and severity, to which a third one, detection, can be added when a system of detection is in 
place. This gives us the classical formula: 
Risk = Probability of occurrence of the harm x Severity of the harm x Detection of the harm. 
Instead of probability it is often used the term frequency, pointing out that most of times 
what we really know is how often it happened in a well established process. It is evident 
that even if we don’t know how to estimate probability, if we really do know that harm 
never happened in our process we can affirm that probability is very low. 
Severity is easier to understand because we are only asked to assess the importance of harm. 
The capacity of detection of harm is linked to the existence of a system for its detection. 
Thus, its assessment tends to be more objective, as it is related to the equipment. This factor, 
however, has a marked particularity: risk increases when the capacity of detection 
decreases; it is an inverse factor. This is not a problem if we bear in mind this fact, but it can 
be easily overcome by changing the way we express it, for instance, instead of talking about 
“detection of the harm” we could say “difficulty of detection of the harm”, thus turning it a 
direct factor like the other two. 
7. How to better evaluate risk? 
All three risk factors can be evaluated either qualitatively or quantitatively. Again, a 
quantitative estimation of risk (e.g. of 45 over 50, say) might appear much more satisfactory 
than a qualitative one (e.g. middle), but this might be too, and often is, misleading, because 
it provides a false sensation of precision. 
As it was discussed above, the main objection one can do regarding risk is that its 
determination is too subjective and this makes it unreliable. Although there is some amount 
of truth in this, we may, however, counterattack by explaining that the objective of assessing 
risk is not getting a faithful estimate of it, but obtaining a risk baseline to be used as an 
indicator for future improvement. This is why what really matters is providing a good deal 
of information on the rationale which led to the estimation of the factors of risk. 
Independently from that, it is necessary to determine how many risk levels will be estimated 
for each hazard. The simplest case and maybe the commonest too is the utilization of three 
levels, a very intuitive approach, as we are talking about “a lot” (high), “medium” (middle) 
and “little” (low). More levels allow for a better classification, but they turn more complicate 
the assessment. 
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Another point that needs to be discussed, when using quantitative evaluation, is the 
relation between these levels. Beside the normal series of values (1, 2, 3, etc.), we might use 
other with wider gaps between the levels, either regular (e. g., 1, 3, 5, 7) or even irregular 
(e. g., 1, 3, 7, 12). These last cases would give more weight to the higher levels, thus 
increasing the sensation of higher risk. It is not necessary to insist on the fact that any type 
of characterization of the levels is acceptable, provided that it is clearly defined and 
indicated and that it is not used to take false conclusions regarding higher evaluations of 
risk. 
7.1. Qualitative evaluation 
For instance in three levels: 
 
Evaluation PROBABILITY SEVERITY 
DIFFICULTY OF 
DETECTION 
High 
The failure /accident occurs 
frequently 
The consequences of the failure 
/accident are important 
The failure /accident will very 
likely not be detected 
Medium 
The failure /accident occurs 
periodically 
The consequences of the failure 
/accident are moderate 
The failure /accident might be 
detected 
Low 
The failure /accident occurs 
rarely 
The consequences of the failure 
/accident are low 
The failure /accident will very 
likely be detected 
Table 12. Example of qualitative evaluation in three levels 
More than three levels: 
 
Evaluation PROBABILITY SEVERITY DIFFICULTY OF DETECTION 
Very high Always Catastrophic It cannot be detected 
High Often (probable) Critical It can only be detected when the process is already finished 
Medium Sometimes Serious It can be detected during one of the stages of the process 
Low Rare (improbable) Minor It can be detected during the stage in process 
Very low Non observable Insignificant It can be detected instantaneously 
Table 13. Example of qualitative evaluation in five levels 
An important inconvenient of the qualitative evaluation of the factors appears when 
determining risk. Everybody would agree that low x medium x high = medium, but the 
score of low x low x high is not so evident (medium?). And this becomes even more unclear 
if we consider more than three levels. 
This is however less important that it might seem at first sight. As we have seen above, risk 
estimation, and particularly the qualitative one, is likely to be more a rough approximation 
than a very exact value. Thus, adding some more roughness should not be considered 
critical. In any case, this inconvenient can be overcome by using a complementary table 
which would provide a homogeneous estimation. 
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Risk = Low x Low x Low = Low Risk = Medium x Medium x Medium = Medium 
Risk = Low x Low x Medium = Low-Medium Risk = Medium x Medium x High = Medium-High 
Risk = Low x Medium x Medium = Medium-Low Risk = Medium x High x High = High-Medium 
Risk = Low x Medium x High = Medium Risk = High x High x High = High 
Risk = Low x High x High = Medium-High ---- 
Table 14. Example of table for the qualitative estimation of risk 
It is evident that if the risk factors are estimated by using more than three levels, then the 
table becomes more complicated. 
7.2. Quantitative evaluation 
If it is done in three levels, then the approach might be exactly the same that shown above 
for the qualitative estimation, but instead of low, medium and high there will be used 
numbers (1, 2, 3) and this will facilitate calculation (e. g., 3 x 1 x 2 = 6). 
The next table provides an example of quantitative evaluation in five levels, both 
following the natural series of numbers and an irregular (or “enhanced”) one. Both are, of 
course, acceptable, but it is necessary to bear in mind that the final risk quantification will 
depend on the system which has been chosen and thus comparisons have to take this into 
account. 
 
Evaluation (two 
options) PROBABILITY SEVERITY 
DIFFICULTY OF 
DETECTION 
1st 2nd 
1 1 Expected >80% of times. Batch is OOS and it is rejected. No detection. 
2 3 Expected between >50% 
and ≤80% of times 
There are deviations and batch 
is investigated and rejected. 
Detection but only when the 
process is finished 
3 5 Expected between >10% 
and ≤50% of times. 
There are deviations and batch 
is investigated but accepted. 
Detection during a stage of the 
process, before finishing it. 
4) 7 Expected between >1% 
and ≤10% of times. 
A trend is detected, but limits 
are not exceeded and the batch 
is not investigated. 
Detection during the stage in 
process. 
5 9 Expected ≤1% of times. There is no trend and limits are 
not exceeded. Batch is not 
investigated. 
Instantaneous detection. 
Table 15. Example of quantitative evaluation of the factors of risk in five levels 
8. How to introduce QRM in a company? 
One might tend to think that what matters is to teach people how to use QRA tools and how 
to evaluate risk. Although this is something that has to be done, it is necessary to bear in 
mind that this is only second to the understanding of the purpose and practical utility of 
QRM. 
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QRM is not just a kind of new task in a company. It is, in fact, a new way of looking at 
things, a new approach in analyzing the problems and in proposing solutions to them. This 
is why the most important and basic task is to make up the mind of people. 
 
Figure 13. Introduction of QRM in a company 
To simplify matters it is generally agreed that a good practice is to prepare a detailed 
protocol describing how the company intends to develop and to apply QRM. 
9. Is there a way to facilitate QRA? 
Everybody can have a personal approach towards QRA, but experience shows that there are 
no simple ways. As said above a good knowledge of the subject is essential, then some dose 
of experience is helpful and a big amount of patience is necessary. 
It has already been described the paramount importance of getting information on the 
subject and how this can be done. It has also been explained how to choose and use the 
more common (and practical) tools. Thus, getting an adequate QRA is just a question of 
work. Get a first draft, review it and improve it little by little until getting something 
satisfactory. There are no rules, but the approach of working by progressive “retouches” is 
certainly very appropriate. 
It is worth to mention that while working on QRA one of the most puzzling aspects is the 
frequent confusion that one tends to experience regarding “hazard”, “cause” and “effect”. This 
can be overcome in two complementary ways. Firstly by understanding well the meaning of 
these terms and applying them carefully to the elements being analyzed and secondly by 
reviewing the draft after a few hours of rest. Normally what is not seen clear now, it will be later. 
10. Why QRA is worthy? 
QRA provides us with a systematic and deep knowledge of the problems faced by the 
process under study. In this sense QRA can help us to overcome one of the main troubles 
derived of the application of GMP, their being seen as a kind of “tables of the law”. The 
consideration of GMP as the golden principles supposed to provide the answer for every 
problem, has often led to a passive attitude. We had a problem and then we looked up in 
Explain what QRM is and why is important and 
Prepare a QRM procedure
Remember that the 
documentation of the QS has 
to take into account QRM 
Provide training
Introduce progressively QRM
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GMP. Now, QRA means that we analyze and understand well our problem. It is not 
necessary to say that this is extremely important and worthy. 
QRA is also a key element in the introduction of improvement in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Without the concept of QRA, improvement would not be understood. In the past 
improvement didn’t exist, because we didn’t accept risk. Now when we recognize risk and 
accept that it is inevitable we can also say that improvement exists and that it consists of the 
reduction of this risk. 
11. Some common problems solved by using QRA 
QRA is a powerful instrument, which may help to solve typical problems faced by the 
technicians working in a pharmaceutical laboratory and in this sense the ICH Q9 guideline 
provides many examples regarding the potential applications of QRA “in [4]”. It is however 
worthwhile to study in detail three very common problems: documentation, 
inspections/audits and handling of active products. 
11.1. Documentation 
“Which documents do I need?” or “tell me which documents I have to prepare and I will do 
it” are much heard questions. And this is so because GMP does not provide an answer. An 
impossible answer, anyway, because documentation is closely related to every particular 
situation and this is why GMP just mentions the documents directly associated with the 
products (specifications, formulae, processing instructions, etc.) and some general 
documents (sampling, testing, release, etc.). Documents have to be established on a case by 
case base, even if in the end all laboratories finish by having about the same documents and 
the basic difference relies on their extension and on how information is organized and 
grouped. 
Documentation is used to attain two basic goals, information on how to perform operations, 
in general, and confidence in the control of critical operations, in particular. The first 
determines basically the number of documents to be written, whereas the second focuses on 
their contents. 
Write a list of the processes of your company and then prepare flow charts for each of them. 
By doing this a number of operations will appear. Procedures have to describe these 
operations. There is no rule of thumb about how many are needed. Neither very long nor 
very short procedures are practical. Consequently a certain level of grouping is necessary 
and each company has to decide how to do it. Factors which might help in this decision are 
basically related to logistics, organization and personnel. 
Once you have these flow charts perform on them QRA using a very basic tool such as PHA. 
This will allow detecting hazards and will oblige thinking of the related control measures. 
And then, these control measures will have to appear in the documents describing the 
operations. 
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Figure 14. The documentation virtuous circle 
11.2. Inspections / Audits 
Inspections and audits worry always personnel. They remind them of the student days and 
consequently they ask themselves again “how can I pass them successfully”? In the school 
the obvious answer would have been “learn well the lessons of the program”, but in the 
pharmaceutical industry the program is less obvious and “lessons” are not so clearly stated. 
They have to take into account GMP, of course, but also other things (GLP, regulations, 
guidelines, unwritten expectations, company standards, etc.). Here again QRA can help us. 
As summarized in the figure below our approach should focus in showing that we know 
our hazards and we keep them mastered. 
 
Figure 15. How to face an inspection/audit 
Pharmaceutical company
Objective: Ensure the quality of the 
products
Course of action: Identify the hazards 
and their causes and implement control 
measures
Measures: Write procedures (SOPs) and 
train people
Results: Hazards are controlled and the 
quality of the products is ensured
Auditor / Inspector
Objective: Convince herself / himself that 
the quality of the products is ensured 
Course of action: Verify that hazards 
and their causes have been identified 
and that control measures are in place 
Measures: Verify that procedures (SOPs) 
exist, that they are appropriate and that 
personnel has been trained
Results: It has been verified that hazards 
are controlled and that the quality of the 
products is ensured
Identify processes
Find control measures
Prepare flow-charts
Perform PHA
Identify operations
Identify hazards
Write procedures
Continual improvement
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11.3. Handling of active products 
GMP establishes the need for dedicated facilities in some cases (production of penicillin or 
live microorganisms) or requires separation for certain products (antibiotics, hormones, 
cytotoxics, etc.). Most products are however manufactured in multiproduct facilities, where 
products share utilities and equipment, after performing the required validations. As 
products and processes can be very varied it is evident that the orientation provided by 
GMP can’t be very detailed. This is why a QRA approach is very useful. 
Among both extremes, a dedicated building (with separated equipment and utilities) and a 
multiproduct facility, there are less radical solutions, such as, for instance, separated areas 
(rooms or set of rooms with their own air-locks and changing rooms), provided with 
separate equipment and utilities, within a multiproduct unit. Also, when this is feasible, a 
simpler way of preventing cross-contamination might be the use of specific parts of 
equipment (e.g., filters, sieves), instead of dedicated equipment. 
Another approach would be segregating the process from its environment by using isolation 
technology (i.e. production equipment within isolators or closed equipment instead of 
separating the rooms). 
Campaign manufacturing, which certainly requires appropriate validation, is also a way to 
prevent cross-contamination. 
The application of quality risk assessment to the products and to the processes to be 
performed within a pharmaceutical unit, allows for their rational design. 
 
Figure 16. Handling of active products: QRA approach 
QRA 
Product: Toxicity, physical properties, etc. 
Premises: Flows of materials/personnel, isolator technology, dedicated (separated) buildings/areas/rooms, etc. 
Process: Flows, batch size, changeover frequency, sequences, etc. 
Equipment: Dedicated/non dedicated, open/closed, product contact materials. 
Utilities: Design, dedicated (separate), etc. 
Complementary activities: Cleaning, maintenance, sewage/refuse handling, etc. 
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The appraisal of the hazard can be performed by using primary hazard analysis (PHA) as it 
was previously described. In this case from the five categories of hazards mentioned only 
two have to be taken into account: environmental contamination and cross-contamination. 
 
Hazard Cause Preventive measure Comments
Environmental 
contamination 
Release of dust, 
particles, 
droplets, 
aerosols, 
effluents and 
waste 
Manufacturing areas are 
isolated 
Clean-rooms are isolated from the environment 
Products are isolated Product containment inside closed systems 
Air handling HEPA-filtered air 
Pressure differentials 
Negative pressure impedes the diffusion of 
particles 
Effluent treatment 
Cleaning effluents are treated before being 
released to the sewer 
Waste control Wastes are disposed of in an adequate manner 
Control of dust 
Release of dust is kept under control (closed 
systems / dust extraction) 
Personal protective equipment (PPE) 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 16. Handling of active products – QRA – Environmental contamination 
Although in both cases the causes are similar, the array of control measures is very varied 
and concerns different systems. 
 
Hazard Cause Preventive measure Comments 
Cross-
contamination 
Release of dust, 
droplets, particles, 
aerosols, during 
operations 
Manufacturing areas are separated 
Different pharmaceutical forms are completely 
separated 
Products are physically separated Only one product at a time 
Environments are separated 
HVAC system provides environment cleanliness 
(classification) and separation (pressure 
differentials) 
Access of personnel across specific 
changing rooms 
There is an specific change room for each area 
Transfers across air-locks 
All materials and products are transferred across 
air-locks 
Air treatment HEPA-filtered air 
Differential pressure / Airflows 
HVAC system provides environment cleanliness 
(classification) and separation (pressure 
differentials) 
Use of closed systems Production is performed in closed systems. 
Temporal separation of products 
Campaign working allows for a simplification in 
cleaning. 
Residues on equipment 
“Sanitary” design and construction Clean-rooms follow GMP-design 
Cleaning / sanitation Validated cleaning procedures 
Dust / particles on 
clothing 
Use of specific clothing 
Clothing is related to the type of operation, which is 
carried out 
Note: The contents of this table are just given as an example; they don’t intend to represent any real situation. 
Table 17. Handling of active products – QRA – Cross-contamination 
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